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SHOW ME THE MONEY:  
THE CEO PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE 
AND THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORM 
Biagio Marino* 
 
The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule (“the Rule”) represents the latest 
regulation designed to combat one of corporate governance’s most 
polarizing issues:  the meteoric rise of executive compensation and its 
damaging effect on the income inequality gap in the United States.  Adopted 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in August 2015, and 
effective in 2018, the Rule comports with over eighty years of regulations 
that have required public companies to disclose information about their pay 
practices.  The Rule now mandates further public disclosure by requiring 
companies to reveal the ratio of their CEO’s compensation to the median 
annual compensation of all other company workers. 
Although a company’s board of directors determines compensation 
levels, the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule embodies a renewed effort to 
empower shareholders in the process.  By requiring companies to disclose 
more information about their pay practices, regulators believe that 
shareholders will be in a better position to hold boards accountable for 
awarding excessive compensation.  However, given the limited results of 
similar regulations, concerns have emerged regarding the disclosure 
methods employed and whether the current corporate structure of board 
empowerment will continue to inhibit shareholders from achieving this 
regulation’s intended purpose. 
This Note discusses past attempts to combat growing levels of executive 
compensation, analyzes the role of both shareholders and directors in the 
compensation-setting process, and discusses conflicting views concerning 
shareholder-director power, the disclosure mechanism, and the pay-ratio 
metric.  Finally, this Note balances these views by proposing alterations to 
the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule that preserve the long-standing 
corporate structure, while also offering shareholders an accountability 
mechanism to enhance the Rule’s intended results. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Villanova 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Caroline Gentile for her invaluable guidance and 
aid, as well as my loving and supporting family. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Louis Brandeis coined the phrase, “Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”1  For decades, 
regulators adhered to this principle in combating a growing national issue:  
the tremendous rise of executive compensation, and its contribution to the 
overwhelming income inequality gap in the United States.2  From the 1940s 
into the early 1970s, most Americans experienced a broad increase in their 
quality of living, as executives were compensated at levels proportionate to 
other workers.3  However, the income gap began to widen in the 1970s, as 
growth for middle- and lower-income families did not grow at similar levels 
to high-income families.4  The growing compensation disparity between 
executives and the rest of the working nation over the last fifty years has 
only exacerbated the call for reform.5  While in 1965 the CEO-to-worker 
compensation ratio was only 20 to 1, an Economic Policy Institute study 
showed that in 2014, the ratio had grown to 303 to 1.6  Today, a Walmart 
employee earning $9 per hour must work 1,036 hours to earn the same 
salary that Walmart’s CEO earns in just one hour.7  Along with these 
statistics, executive compensation has developed into a “hot-button issue” 
largely due to the process in which it is determined, as well as public 
instances of executive pay being uncorrelated with company or personal 
performance.8  The most famous example includes the ousting of former 
Disney president Michael Ovitz, who received a total of $140 million in pay 
despite being employed for only fourteen months.9 
Although a company’s board of directors determines compensation, 
regulators have progressively focused on empowering shareholders in the 
process by providing them with more information about a company’s pay 
 
 1. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1932). 
 2. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 331–42 (4th ed. 2012); see also Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill:  
The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 302 
(2009) (“No corporate governance issue captures the imagination and frustration of the 
American public and politicians more than executive compensation.”). 
 3. See CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO 
STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/ 
sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-11pov_1.pdf (“Incomes grew rapidly and at roughly the 
same rate up and down the income ladder, roughly doubling in inflation-adjusted terms 
between the late 1940s and early 1970s.”) [https://perma.cc/853K-N3X9]. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 6. Press Release, Econ. Policy Inst., CEOs Made 303 Times More Than Typical 
Workers in 2014 (June 22, 2015), http://www.epi.org/press/ceos-made-303-times-more-than-
typical-workers-in-2014/ [https://perma.cc/4L2N-EB49]. 
 7. See EXECUTIVE PAY WATCH, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-
2015# (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4SW7-P8HP]. 
 8. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial:  International Perspective on 
the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 10 (2008); see 
also Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap:  Board Capture or 
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1182–83 (2004). 
 9. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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practices and levels.10  The latest example is the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule (“the Rule”).11  
Adopted in August 2015, and effective in 2018, the final Rule requires 
public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of their CEO to 
the median compensation of the rest of their employees.12  The SEC 
believes that this will provide shareholders with additional information 
when exercising their say-on-pay votes.13  Implemented under the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection Act14 (Dodd-Frank), say-on-
pay votes are nonbinding advisory shareholder votes to approve or 
disapprove of the compensation paid to named executive officers.15 
Despite increased regulations, executive pay has skyrocketed over the 
last fifty years.16  Inadequate results have fostered concerns regarding the 
federal government’s and the SEC’s methods in combating this evolving 
issue.  First, a question arises as to whether disclosure is a proper method to 
aid shareholders and, if so, whether regulations such as the CEO Pay Ratio 
Disclosure Rule are focusing on the “right” information to disclose.  
Second, opposing groups debate whether the allocation of power between 
shareholders and directors in corporate affairs is adequately structured to 
facilitate shareholder activism in a way that allows them to adequately 
rectify the pay-setting process. 
Part I provides a background of the history of executive compensation, 
including how it is determined, the role of directors and shareholders in the 
process, a summary of past regulations, and the basic components of the 
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule.  Part II then analyzes the shareholder-
director power struggle, whether disclosure is an efficient technique to 
combat this issue, and, specifically, whether the use of a “ratio” is a proper 
disclosure metric.  Lastly, Part III proposes alterations to the pay ratio and 
compensation-setting process that affirm the necessary powers of the board 
of directors and also provide shareholders with the mechanisms needed to 
effectuate meaningful change. 
I.  EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION:  
THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW 
While many debate its cause and potential consequences for our nation, 
there has been an undisputed and dramatic rise in executive compensation, 
 
 10. See infra Part I.C. 
 11. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 
75610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [hereinafter Pay Ratio Press Release] 
[https://perma.cc/SEG7-78JD]. 
 14. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 15. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute 
Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Say-on-Pay 
Press Release], https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm [https://perma.cc/KX3A-
XLYD]. 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
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and it has contributed to the income inequality gap in our nation.17  Part I.A 
discusses the basics of executive compensation, including its structure, how 
it is determined, and the power of shareholders in the process.  Part I.B then 
examines the history of executive compensation trends, including the shift 
toward incentive-based compensation and the emergence of institutional 
investors as potential “problem solvers.”  Next, Part I.C discusses various 
corrective executive compensation reforms adopted by the federal 
government and the SEC.  Finally, Part I.D outlines the basic components 
of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule. 
A.  Determining Executive Compensation 
Although the exact structure differs from company to company, 
executive compensation generally refers to a manager’s total pay package, 
including base salary, bonuses, stock grants,18 stock options,19 and other 
financial benefits.20  In public corporations, the board of directors is 
responsible for setting executive compensation packages on behalf of 
shareholders.21  Generally, the board will form a compensation committee 
composed of independent directors.22  In crafting compensation packages, 
the committee relies on hired consultants and experts who provide them 
with information on common pay practices.23  One ordinary practice 
involves utilizing information from “peer groups,” which represent 
companies that are similar in size, market reach, and other relevant 
factors.24  Committees ordinarily use the pay practices and levels of these 
peer groups as a benchmark when structuring their own compensation 
packages.25  After the committee evaluates the company’s executives and 
 
 17. See Income Inequality Is America’s 21st Century Monster, VOICE REPORTER (May 6, 
2011), http://voiceforthemembersslate.blogspot.com/2011/05/income-inequality-is-americas-
21st.html (citing reports suggesting that income inequality in the United States is worse than 
in countries like Pakistan, Ethiopia, and the Ivory Coast) [https://perma.cc/A3M7-3GTB]. 
 18. Stock grants are a specific number of shares in the company that executives 
frequently receive at the beginning of the year. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 332. 
 19. Stock options are commonly known as “call” options.  They refer to the right, but 
not an obligation, to purchase a certain number of shares at a set price.  Employees are 
allowed to exercise this option within a certain period or on a specific date.  Holders of stock 
options typically want to exercise these options when the call price is below the market 
price. See Employee Stock Option—ESO, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/e/eso.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P6LT-KTAU]. 
 20. See Executive Compensation Resource Center:  Overview, SIFMA, http:// 
www.sifma.org/issues/regulatory-reform/executive-compensation/overview/ (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Z2RJ-X5S2]. 
 21. See Matthew Farrell, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive 
Compensation:  The Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of 
America Corp., 96 CORNELL L. REV. 169, 173 (2010). 
 22. See id.  Generally, directors are “independent” if they are not current or former 
employees of the company and have no other company affiliations. See id. at 173 n.17. 
 23. See id. at 173. 
 24. Penny Hersher, Ratcheting up CEO Pay—or Competing for Talent?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/penny-herscher/ratcheting-up-ceo-
pay---o_b_272218.html [https://perma.cc/6WEN-VFZU]. 
 25. See Peter Whoriskey, Cozy Relationships and “Peer Benchmarking” Send CEOs’ 
Pay Soaring, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
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determines appropriate pay levels, the board reviews it and officially has the 
final say.26  However, the board usually approves this package “as a routine 
matter without much inquiry.”27 
Directors acquire the authority to make corporate governance decisions, 
such as setting executive compensation levels, from the Delaware Code.  
Title 8, section 141 states that “[t]he business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”28  This provides the board with tremendous discretion to control 
corporations and make decisions independent from shareholders.  Corporate 
law provides shareholders with voting rights only in limited instances:  (1) 
electing the board of directors;29 (2) removing the directors;30 (3) voting on 
charter amendments;31 and (4) voting on fundamental corporate changes, 
such as a merger agreement32 or the sale of a certain amount of company 
assets.33  Therefore, the only way for shareholders to currently exert any 
influence on this issue is by removing directors who award excessive pay 
packages. 
First, shareholders may replace board members at the annual shareholder 
meeting if another candidate obtains the plurality votes needed,34 unless a 
bylaw or charter provision specifies otherwise.35  Nevertheless, only 
candidates nominated by the board itself are included in the company’s 
proxy materials.36  Shareholders nominating an alternate candidate 
 
economy/cozy-relationships-and-peer-benchmarking-send-ceos-pay-soaring/2011/09/ 
22/gIQAgq8NJL_print.html (noting that “researchers have found that about 90 percent of 
major U.S. companies expressly set their executive pay targets at or above the median of 
their peer group”) [https://perma.cc/EC88-JZ46]. 
 26. See Farrell, supra note 21, at 173. 
 27. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on 
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1999). 
 28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016). 
 29. Id. § 211(b).  This is done at an annual stockholder meeting on a date and time 
specified in the corporation’s bylaws. See id. 
 30. Id. § 141(k).  Unless specified differently in a corporation’s charter, shareholders 
may remove any director, with or without cause, through a majority vote at an annual 
shareholder meeting. See id. 
 31. Id. § 242(a).  Shareholders may vote to amend provisions in the charter only after the 
board of directors passes a resolution setting forth the proposed amendment. See id. 
§ 242(b)(1). 
 32. Id. § 251(c).  Shareholders may vote on merger agreements only after the board of 
directors approves the merger, and the shareholders are not subject to the exceptions listed in 
section 251(f). See id. 
 33. Id. § 271(a). 
 34. Id. § 216(3). 
 35. Altering the shareholder votes needed contrary to the plurality rule requires a charter 
or bylaw provision pursuant to section 216 of the Delaware Code. See id. 
 36. See Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1305 (2013).  
Proxy materials are “documents [that] are used to inform shareholders and solicit votes for 
corporate decisions, such as the election of directors . . . .  SEC regulations require a public 
company to disclose specific information in its proxy materials, so that investors can be clear 
on the procedures to follow in certain circumstances.” Proxy Materials, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proxymaterials.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/EG35-4UZG]. 
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therefore bear the costs of independent proxy solicitations.37  If the board is 
staggered,38 shareholders may not replace a director who is not up for 
election at the annual shareholder meeting.39  Second, any director may be 
removed with or without cause by a majority shareholder vote.40  However, 
directors on a staggered board may be removed only for cause.41 
Subject to various limitations, shareholders may submit rule proposals on 
issues such as executive compensation, which are then required to be voted 
on under SEC Rule 14a-8.42  When voting on these proposals, or those 
submitted by managers or other shareholders, votes are required in the form 
of either approval or rejection without allowing for commentary or 
suggestions.43 
B.  More Money, More Problems:  
The Rise of Executive Compensation 
and Performance-Based Pay 
The last fifty years have witnessed the explosion of executive pay levels, 
the evolution of incentive-based compensation44—including its failure to 
link pay to performance—and its contribution to income inequality.  
Overall, inflation-adjusted CEO compensation increased 997 percent from 
1978 to 2014.45  Given that a typical worker’s annual compensation grew 
by only 10.9 percent during the same period, it is apparent why public 
scrutiny of this issue has increased.46  Despite the stock market’s decline by 
roughly half between 1965 and 1978, CEO annual compensation still 
increased by 78.7 percent.47  This general trend continued as CEO 
compensation grew progressively in the 1980s, exploded in the 1990s, and 
peaked in 2000.48 
 
 37. See Kang, supra note 36, at 1306–07.  They must pay for proxy materials to be 
mailed to shareholders. See id. 
 38. “If a staggered board is chosen, the directors shall be divided into two or three 
classes as nearly equal in number as possible and one class shall be elected by ballot 
annually.” 12 C.F.R. § 239.27(b) (2014). 
 39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). 
 40. Id. § 141(k). 
 41. Id. § 141(k)(1). 
 42. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. 
 43. See Kang, supra note 36, at 1307. 
 44. Incentive-based compensation is synonymous with performance-based 
compensation. 
 45. Alyssa Davis & Lawrence Mishel, CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers 
Are Paid Less, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 3–4 (June 21, 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/top-
ceos-make-300-times-more-than-typical-workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6VD-9GB2]. 
 46. See id.; see also David Owen, The Pay Problem:  What’s to Be Done About C.E.O. 
Compensation?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2009/10/12/the-pay-problem [https://perma.cc/MLC6-KNCK]. 
 47. See Davis & Mishel, supra note 45, at 3–4. 
 48. See id.; Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation:  A New View 
from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005, at 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 14145, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14145.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HHF-
YVUU]. 
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Up until the late 1980s, CEOs and other top executives were typically 
compensated like all other employees in their companies.49  Their 
compensation was comprised of an annual salary and a discretionary 
bonus.50  Yet, despite decreases in company profits, most executive salaries 
and bonuses continued to grow.51  Because CEOs and top executives 
received large salaries regardless of corporate performance, compensation 
structures at the time provided little incentive for them to expend maximum 
effort to enhance shareholder profits, the primary goal of any business or 
corporation.52  In response to increased public pressure to correlate 
executive pay with performance, boards began compensating executives in 
the form of stock grants and, to a greater extent, stock options.53  Boards 
viewed these performance-based pay structures as a way to align the goals 
of executives and shareholders, thereby mitigating agency problems.54  The 
harder executives worked to maximize the profits of shareholders, the more 
the stock grants and options awarded to them would be worth.55  While 
only 30 percent of CEOs received stock option awards during the 1980s, 
this number rose to roughly 70 percent by 1994.56  Nonetheless, incentive-
based pay did little to alleviate, and may have even exacerbated, problems 
of uncorrelated pay and performance.  Surveys indicate that from 1991–
1993, CEOs at the largest U.S. corporations earned $2.4 million, $3.5 
million, and $4.1 million in those respective years.57  By 2000, the average 
CEO earned approximately $20 million,58 with large companies such as 
Enron paying their top five executives a staggering total of 
$282.7 million.59 
After peaking in 2000, pay fluctuations occurred due to the rise and fall 
of the stock market.60  After an initial decline in CEO pay in the early 
 
 49. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 331. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Graef S. Crystal, How Much CEOs Really Make, FORTUNE (June 17, 1991), 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1991/06/17/75159/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C6L4-82MQ]. 
 52. See Lori B. Marino, Comment, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced 
Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1205, 1212–13 
(1999). 
 53. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 332; see also Graef Crystal, CEOs and Incentives:  
The Myth of “Pay-for-Performance,” L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
1995-01-08/business/fi-17839_1_pay-package [https://perma.cc/CP5F-VTR9]. 
 54. For a discussion on agency problems, see infra Part II.A. 
 55. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like 
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 653–54 (1998) (“If there is no meaningful link between 
CEO pay and company performance, it is doubtful that the trillions of dollars of assets in 
public corporations are being managed efficiently.”). 
 56. See id. at 663.  Over this same period, the average value of a stock option grant rose 
683 percent, from $155,000 to $1,200,000. See id. at 662. 
 57. See Marino, supra note 52, at 1210. 
 58. See Davis & Mishel, supra note 45, at 3. 
 59. See Dan Ackman, Pay Madness at Enron, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2002), 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/03/22/0322enronpay.html [https://perma.cc/5WRC-2TUL]. 
 60. See generally Rick Newman, The CEO “Pay Gap” Is Actually Narrowing, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-
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2000s, pay levels bounced back in 2007.61  A similar recovery occurred in 
2014 following the 2008 financial crisis.62  Although executive pay 
currently remains below the peak levels of the early 2000s, it still remains 
substantially higher than levels reported before the turn of the century.63  
Furthermore, stock options still make up the largest component of the 
average large company’s CEO pay package today.64 
C.  Disclosure-Related Executive Compensation Reforms 
Part I.C.1 discusses the history and development of SEC regulations 
designed to curb growing executive compensation levels.  Part I.C.2 then 
examines similar actions taken by the federal government. 
1.  SEC Regulations:  
Securities Act, Exchange Act, and Subsequent Revisions 
Since 1933, regulators have implemented the philosophy of disclosure in 
most, if not all, executive compensation regulations.  The SEC maintains 
that it is not its duty to regulate and determine the “right” level of 
compensation for executives but rather that this responsibility lies with the 
compensation committee of the board of directors.65  Despite these 
assertions, the SEC has enacted various regulations with the purpose of 
“advanc[ing] the interests of shareholders through better disclosure.”66  
Although they do not directly influence pay levels, shareholders may, in 
theory, replace directors who they believe award excessive compensation 
packages.67  Requiring companies to disclose information about executive 
 
newman/2013/04/17/the-ceo-pay-gap-is-actually-narrowing (discussing how the pay gap 
narrowed in the early 2000s but has since recovered) [https://perma.cc/8D2J-KXXA]. 
 61. See Davis & Mishel, supra note 45, at 4. 
 62. See id. at 6 (noting that by 2014, the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio also 
recovered to 303.4 to 1, a rise of 107.6 from 2009). 
 63. See id.  Accompanying the tremendous rise of executive compensation has been the 
development of institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, 
mutual funds, investment advisors, etc.) as shareholders. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Liquidity Versus Control:  The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1277 (1991) (discussing the rise of institutional investors in the 1980s).  While these 
investors owned only 7 to 8 percent of U.S. corporations in 1950, by 2010 this level reached 
67 percent, with many owning 2 to 3 percent of a single corporation. See Luis A. Aguilar, 
Comm’r, SEC, Institutional Investors:  Power and Responsibility, Speech at Georgia State 
University (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13651715 
15808 [https://perma.cc/GFR7-W7RU].  Today, institutional investors are responsible for 
roughly 70 percent of the trading on the New York Stock Exchange within a given day. 
Institutional Investors, BUSINESSDICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ 
institutional-investors.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/W9VP-CCUS]. 
 64. See David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 661 
(2005). 
 65. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman:  Introductory Remarks 
at the SEC Open Meeting (July 26, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/ 
spch072606cc.htm [https://perma.cc/6F34-QWBT]. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See supra Part I.A. 
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compensation levels therefore provides shareholders greater insight into the 
decisions of these directors. 
As one of the architects of the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities 
Act”), Felix Frankfurter stated that “[t]he existence of bonuses, of excessive 
commissions and salaries . . . may all be open secrets among the knowing, 
but the knowing are few.”68  Following the 1929 Great Depression, in 
which thousands of employees were laid off, corporate executives increased 
their salaries to compensate for a reduction in profit-based bonuses.69  In 
response to the economic turmoil, Congress passed the Securities Act and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”).  Although both 
addressed a multitude of issues, Congress hoped that its executive 
compensation sections would shame executives into accepting lower pay.70  
For example, section 14 of schedule A of the Securities Act requires public 
companies to disclose the compensation of officers and directors for the 
prior year and the year following an offering if such compensation exceeds 
$25,000.71 
The SEC expanded their regulations in 1938 by enacting the first 
executive compensation disclosure rules for proxy statements.72  In 1942, 
1952, 1978, and 1983, the SEC continuously revised several disclosure 
requirements, including shifting disclosure from a tabular to a narrative 
approach.73  Unlike the tabular approach, which requires companies to 
disclose hard numbers, the narrative approach requires an explanation of a 
company’s pay policies.74  However, the difficulty in comparing 
compensation levels from year to year and company to company became an 
obstacle under the narrative form.75  The SEC responded by significantly 
revising its requirements in 1992 to combine both approaches.76  First, in an 
effort to obtain more detailed information, the SEC established new rules 
requiring companies to disclose the compensation of their CEO and top four 
highest paid executives in tabular form.77  Second, the compensation 
committee was required to describe and explain their compensation 
decisions in narrative form.78  The purpose of these amendments was to 
provide shareholders with knowledge of compensation forms, the method 
 
 68. Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 277, 284 (2007) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Securities Act—Social Consequences, 
FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55). 
 69. See id. at 284–85. 
 70. See id. at 278 (commenting that the opposite effect occurred). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(14) (2012). 
 72. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,160 n.44 (Sept. 8, 2006). 
 73. See Markham, supra note 68, at 285. 
 74. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,160. 
 75. See id. at 53,161. 
 76. See Markham, supra note 68, at 285. 
 77. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange 
Act Release No. 31327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19032, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126, 
48,127 (Oct. 21, 1992); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 335–36. 
 78. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,127; ALLEN ET AL., 
supra note 2, at 336. 
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the board used in reaching their decisions, and the relationship between 
corporate pay and performance.79 
As more complex pay structures emerged, the SEC observed that the 
1992 requirements failed to account for all of the elements of compensation 
that companies began using.80  To rectify these failures, the SEC amended 
the rules in 2006 by calling for companies to provide a single number 
demonstrating the compensation for each of their top executives.81  They 
additionally created the Executive Compensation Disclosure Rule, requiring 
companies to disclose a Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in 
narrative form.82  The CD&A requires companies to give context to the 
mandatory tabular disclosure of compensation numbers by also compelling 
them to provide (1) the objectives of the compensation program, (2) an 
explanation of what the compensation program is designed to reward, (3) 
each element of compensation, (4) the rationale for using each element, (5) 
how the company determines the amount of each element, and (6) how 
these choices fit the compensation objectives as a whole.83  The SEC 
believed that these modifications would be effective in adapting to a 
continuously evolving marketplace.84 
2.  Federal Statutes to Curb Compensation 
In recent years the federal government has joined the SEC’s mission by 
enacting various statutes containing executive compensation provisions.  
Although not focused solely on this issue, they include important 
components that regulators believed would aid in curtailing high pay levels.  
Part I.C.2.a discusses the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and Part I.C.2.b 
outlines various provisions of Dodd-Frank. 
a.  Knock Your SOX Off 
Congress passed SOX in July 200285 in response to various corporate and 
accounting scandals that cost investors billions of dollars.86  Although it 
 
 79. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,126. 
 80. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,160.  
The rigid requirements of 1992 were incompatible with the emerging complexity of 
compensation packages. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech By SEC Chairman:  
Chairman’s Opening Statement; Proposed Revisions to the Executive Compensation and 
Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch011706cc.htm [https://perma.cc/586R-KXEE]. 
 81. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 336. 
 82. See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Securities Act Release 
No. 8655, Exchange Act Release No. 53185, Investment Company Act Release No. 27218, 
71 Fed. Reg. 6,542, 6,545 (Feb. 8, 2006). 
 83. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (b)(1)(i)–(vi) (2014). 
 84. See Cox, supra note 80 (noting that the rules were “out of date”). 
 85. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 86. See Linda Chatman Thomsen & Donna Norman, Sarbanes-Oxley Turns Six:  An 
Enforcement Perspective, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 393, 394 (2008) (“The story behind [SOX] 
begins with the fraud at Enron Corporation, which led to its December 2001 filing of what 
was then the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.”). 
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focused mostly on auditing practices, it federalized provisions for forfeiting 
executive pay.87  Section 304, commonly known as the “clawback” 
provision, provides that if an issuer restates its financials due to excessive 
misconduct, the CEO and CFO are required to pay back any bonuses 
(incentive or equity-based), and trading profits earned in the twelve months 
following the incorrect financial information.88 
However section 304 does not specify what degree of misconduct is 
necessary to trigger the regulation, it only governs the recoupment of 
compensation paid to CEOs and CFOs, and it does not specify that the CEO 
or CFO be involved in or have knowledge of the misconduct.89  This 
ambiguity has generated criticisms that were highlighted most notably in 
SEC v. Jenkins.90  Although the SEC admitted that the former chairman and 
CEO of CSK Auto Corporation did not engage in personal misconduct, it 
sought reimbursement of $4 million from him because he signed off on 
fraudulent financial statements.91  Based on a plain language reading of the 
statute, the District Court of Arizona held that a CEO could be liable for a 
company’s fraudulent financial statements without committing any 
misconduct or violating any securities law.92  In other words, section 304 
imposes “vicarious strict liability” on CEOs and CFOs.93 
b.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act 
Congress augmented its response to executive compensation and income 
disparity problems by passing Dodd-Frank in 2010.94  Dodd-Frank targets 
four specific reforms aimed at providing greater transparency and 
accountability on executive compensation:  clawbacks, say-on-pay, 
compensation committee independence, and pay versus performance 
disclosure.95 
 
 87. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 328. 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2012).  The term “issuer” refers to the corporation issuing the 
bonus. 
 89. See id. 
 90. 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
 91. See id. at 1072–73. 
 92. See id. at 1075 (“Applying these steps of statutory interpretation, the Court holds 
that the text and structure of Section 304 require only the misconduct of the issuer, but do 
not necessarily require the specific misconduct of the issuer’s CEO or CFO.”). 
 93. See Isaac U. Kimes, Unfettered Clawbacks—Why Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act Requires a Personal Misconduct Standard, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 797, 813 (2012). 
 94. See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner:  Remarks 
Before the Forum for Corporate Directors (Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2011/spch032211klc.htm (“Dodd-Frank is more than ten times longer, and 
mandates more than ten times the rulemakings and studies that [SOX] required.”) 
[https://perma.cc/WSY2-AV9X]. 
 95. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware:  Why Congress 
Should Stay out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 734 (2013) (“Congress 
made a deliberate determination that the financial crisis had exposed shareholders’ inability 
to ensure management accountability.”). 
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Section 954 clarified and added a more stringent clawback requirement 
than SOX in three important ways.  First, it extended the look-back period 
from twelve months to three years.96  Second, it broadened the scope of 
clawbacks beyond just the CEO and CFO to include any current or former 
executive.97  Third, it clarified SOX’s ambiguity by mandating that 
evidence of misconduct is no longer required.98  Therefore, incentive-based 
compensation such as stock options can be recovered regardless of whether 
executive misconduct was involved in a company’s material noncompliance 
with financial reporting requirements. 
Additionally, section 951 mandated the creation of say-on-pay, an 
advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation.99  It currently 
mandates that public companies must give their shareholders an advisory 
vote—at least once every three years based on shareholder preference—to 
approve or disapprove of the compensation paid to their CEOs and four 
highest earning executives during the prior fiscal year.100  The mandate’s 
primary purpose is to empower shareholders to hold executives accountable 
for compensation schemes that they reject.101  However, Dodd-Frank 
ensures that no shareholder vote is able to overrule decisions made by the 
company or its board.102  In other words, none of the shareholder votes 
carry mandatory force.103  Companies must instead only reveal the board’s 
consideration of shareholder votes when making any decisions the 
following year.104 
Adopted to strengthen the objectivity of compensation committees, 
section 952 now requires all publicly traded U.S. companies to comprise 
their committees of directors who are independent.105  Boards must now 
consider whether any directors (1) received any additional fees beyond just 
director fees and (2) have any affiliations with the company or a related 
subsidiary.106 
Lastly, section 953 enhanced the 2006 SEC executive compensation 
regulations by requiring companies to disclose the relationship between 
executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the 
company, taking into account changes in the value of shares of stock and 
 
 96. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (2012). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. § 78n-1.  The SEC adopted Rule 14a-21(a) and other rules on January 25, 2011. 
Say-on-Pay Press Release, supra note 15. 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1). 
 101. See Fisch, supra note 95, at 734, 737. 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)(1)–(3). 
 103. However, this does not prohibit shareholders from making their own proposals 
through proxy materials. See id. § 78n-1(c)(4). 
 104. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute 
Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 9178, Exchange Act Release No. 63768, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 6010, 6016 (Feb. 2, 2011). 
 105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3. 
 106. See id. § 78j-3(a)(3). 
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dividends.107  Section 953 additionally mandated the SEC to adopt the CEO 
Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule.108 
D.  CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule 
In accordance with their congressional mandate, the SEC adopted the 
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule on August 18, 2015.109  Effective in 2018, 
the final Rule requires public companies to (1) disclose the annual total 
compensation of their CEO, (2) report the median of the annual total 
compensation of all other employees, and (3) provide the ratio of the annual 
total compensation of all employees to the annual total compensation of the 
CEO.110  The SEC believes that this new regulation will strike an 
appropriate balance that aids both companies and shareholders.111  First, it 
asserts that the Rule will assist shareholders during their say-on-pay votes 
because it provides them with additional information when evaluating a 
CEO’s compensation.112  The SEC additionally maintains that the Rule 
provides companies with sufficient flexibility in determining their pay 
ratios that will reduce compliance costs.113 
Companies subject to the Rule are permitted to select any date within the 
final three months of their last fiscal year to determine its employee 
population.114  Those defined as “employees” within the meaning of the 
final Rule include U.S. and foreign employees, as well as part-time, 
seasonal, and temporary employees.115  Companies are allowed to exclude 
foreign employees from their median employee determination only under a 
data privacy exception or a de minimis exception.116 
The Rule does not require companies to use a specific methodology when 
identifying the median of their employee population.117  Rather, companies 
retain flexibility to calculate the median based on their particular structure 
 
 107. See id. § 78n(i). 
 108. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903–04 (2010). 
 109. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No. 
75610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015). 
 110. See id. at 50,104–05.  This requirement does not apply to emerging growth 
companies, smaller reporting companies, or foreign issuers. See id. at 50,108. 
 111. See Pay Ratio Press Release, supra note 13. 
 112. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,106 (asserting that the pay-ratio rule 
will generate shareholder engagement in executive compensation issues because it provides 
shareholders with a company-specific metric to evaluate the CEO’s compensation within the 
context of the company). 
 113. See Pay Ratio Press Release, supra note 13. 
 114. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,119. 
 115. See id. at 50,116. 
 116. Under a data privacy exception, companies can exclude foreign employees when the 
rule would violate the laws of the foreign country in which the non-U.S. employee works.  
Under a de minimis exception, companies may do so if non-U.S. employees make up 5 
percent or less of the company’s total employee population. See id. at 50,123–35. 
 117. See id. at 50,135.  Companies may identify the median using their total employee 
population or a statistical sampling of that population. See id.  They may then calculate the 
median through options such as annual total compensation or information derived from tax 
and payroll records. See id.  Companies also may apply a cost-of-living adjustment to the 
compensation measure. See id. 
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and business methods.118  They are required, however, to describe the 
methodology that they use.119  Although the SEC recognized potential 
complexities without a uniform procedure, it believed that providing 
companies with flexibility would reduce costs while simultaneously 
aligning the Rule with the goals of section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank.120 
The final Rule defines “annual total compensation” to mean total 
compensation for the last completed fiscal year in accordance with Item 
402(c)(2)(x) of Regulation S-K.121  This includes compensation in the form 
of salary, bonuses, stock awards and options, contributions to retirement 
plans, and other contributions to personal benefits.122  Although Item 
402(c)(2)(x) is ordinarily used for calculating the compensation of only 
CEOs and other named executives, applying it to all other employees 
ensures consistent results.  In accordance with granting companies adequate 
flexibility, the Rule allows for reasonable estimates in calculating any 
element of total compensation.123 
II.  CONFLICTS WITHIN CONFLICT:  
SEARCHING FOR THE RIGHT FORMULA 
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DILEMMA 
Recent executive compensation reforms have concentrated on 
empowering shareholders through increased disclosure.  While some view 
enhanced shareholder power as a necessary solution for corporate 
governance reform, others are wary of its dangerous deviation from long-
established corporate law principals.  Part II.A begins with a discussion of 
the principal-agent problem that is central to this schism among executive 
compensation reformers.  Part II.B then discusses conflicting positions 
regarding the proper allocation of power between shareholders and the 
board of directors.  Part II.C addresses whether the SEC’s method of 
enhancing disclosure is a proper means of empowering shareholders.  
Lastly, assuming the benefits disclosure provides, Part II.D analyzes 
whether the innovation of a “pay ratio” is a beneficial disclosure metric for 
shareholders. 
A.  The Principal-Agent Problem 
Various scholars commenting on rising executive pay agree with the 
premise that “[a]ny discussion of executive compensation must proceed 
 
 118. Id. at 50,107 (“[The rule] permit[s] registrants to select a methodology for 
identifying the median employee that was appropriate to the size and structure of their 
business and the way they compensate employees.”). 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. at 50,108.  Item 402(c)(2)(x) requires companies to disclose extensive 
information regarding their CEO’s and other named executive officers’ compensation. See 
id. at 50,107. 
 122. See Stephen Miller, Determining CEO Pay Ratio Isn’t So Simple, SOC’Y HUM. 
RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/compensation/articles/ 
pages/ceo-pay-ratio.aspx [https://perma.cc/4B9Q-HFGV]. 
 123. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,107–08. 
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against the background of the fundamental agency problem afflicting 
management decision-making.”124  An agency relationship is one “that 
arises when one person (‘a principal’) manifests assent to another person 
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to 
the principal’s control.”125  Therefore, agents have power to make decisions 
that affect the principal so long as they are within the scope of their 
delegated authority.126  In an ideal world, agents would always act and 
make decisions that align with the goals of their principal.  However, we 
know that this is not always the case.  Principals therefore incur agency 
costs to assure that suboptimal decisions are not being made.127  The 
principal may expend resources to monitor the agent or provide him or her 
with certain incentives to assure conformity to his or her goals.128 
In the context of corporations, shareholders are principals who delegate 
authority to both directors and managers as their agents.129  Shareholders’ 
goals of maximizing profits and gaining positive investment returns have 
dominated corporate America for decades.130  Nonetheless, because the 
board is vested with the power to manage the corporation’s business and 
affairs, shareholders are unable to ensure that day-to-day decisions are 
made with this goal in mind.131  They therefore elect and hire directors and 
managers who they believe will do so.132  Directors and managers would do 
just that under an efficient model.  However, as rational actors, we also 
expect them to strive to maximize their own utility, sometimes to the 
detriment of shareholder interests.133  Because managers do not have a 
major ownership stake in the corporation, if any at all, they therefore bear 
only a small fraction of the results from their self-interested decisions, 
leaving shareholders to bear the majority of the consequences.134  This 
creates a greater incentive for managers to pursue their own economic 
 
 124. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2003). 
 125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 126. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 8. 
 127. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance:  Overview of 
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 654–55 (2005). 
 128. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 129. See id. at 309 (defining the relationship between stockholders and managers of a 
corporation as a “pure agency relationship”). 
 130. See Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing Shareholder Value:  The Goal That Changed 




 131. See Mark Anson et al., Aligning the Interests of Agents and Owners:  An Empirical 
Examination of Executive Compensation, IVEY BUS. J. (May–June 2004), 
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/aligning-the-interests-of-agents-and-owners-an-
empirical-examination-of-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/UT39-GZGJ]. 
 132. See Jenson & Meckling, supra note 128, at 308–09. 
 133. See id. at 308. 
 134. See Anson et al., supra note 131. 
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motives without considering the detrimental effects it may have on 
shareholders.135 
It is argued that this principal-agent dilemma is the cornerstone of 
executive compensation problems.136  Two approaches, as well as their 
shortcomings, have emerged to analyze this dilemma:  the optimal 
contracting approach and the managerial power approach.  Under the 
optimal contracting approach, boards strive to craft compensation packages 
that minimize agency costs and create a tighter link between the goals of 
shareholders and managers.137  Boards focus on developing compensation 
structures that encourage managers to maximize the value of the company 
and overall shareholder wealth.138  The emergence and modernization of 
stock-option compensation was seen as a way to achieve this goal.139  Yet 
not only did these compensation schemes fail to assuage agency concerns, 
but perhaps unexpectedly they contributed to the rising levels of executive 
compensation.140  Critics assert that their failures, and the limitations of the 
optimal contracting approach, stem from the idea that something is 
obstructing directors from negotiating at arm’s length with management 
during the compensation-setting process.141  Although incentive-based 
compensation may alleviate agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, such problems may still exist among shareholders and 
directors.142  Most directors serving on compensation committees have 
previously held positions as executives at other companies.143  Because 
these directors may therefore have goals more aligned with managers than 
shareholders, they may be more inclined to award higher compensation 
packages.144 
The managerial power approach also highlights the failures of the 
compensation-setting process by emphasizing the ability of managers to 
influence their own compensation by “capturing” the board and extracting 
rent.145  Corporate managers and executives generally have substantial 
 
 135. See id. 
 136. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002). 
 137. See id. at 753 n.4 (describing the optimal contracting approach “taken by an 
important line of legal scholarship”). 
 138. See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference:  Behavioral Corporate 
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 704 (2005). 
 139. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 124, at 82; see also Paredes, supra note 138, at 704 
(“The redesign of options . . . is the very kind of executive compensation innovation that the 
optimal contracting approach anticipates.”). 
 140. See supra Part I.B. 
 141. See Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond:  Assessing the SEC’s 
Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 486 (2007). 
 142. See generally Mary-Hunter Morris, The Price of Advice, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
153 (2009) (discussing the diverging interests of shareholders and directors). 
 143. See id. at 164. 
 144. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 127, at 656. 
 145. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 136, at 786.  Rents are the excess of pay obtained by 
an executive through his power over what he or she would have obtained under optimal 
contracting.  See id. at 784–86. 
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power.146  They are therefore in a superior position to garner the board’s 
support and influence their own pay.147  Although directors may remove an 
underperforming manager or CEO, directors have a tendency to defer to 
their judgments when they are performing adequately.148  This approach 
posits that the only limitations on compensation are “outrage costs and 
constraints” based on how much scrutiny a compensation package is 
expected to drawn from shareholders and the public.149  Directors will 
avoid embarrassment or reputational harm by disapproving compensation 
packages that may result in public backlash.150  Without this check, 
managers would be able to exert unconstrained influence on directors to 
provide them with the greatest compensation packages possible. 
B.  The Power Struggle Between Shareholders and Directors 
The power struggle between shareholders and directors in corporate 
governance affairs has emerged as a potential cause of ineffective executive 
compensation reform.  Shareholder primacists assert that the current 
corporate structure inhibits shareholders from effectuating any positive 
change on important issues and that the allocation of power should be 
altered to reflect the rise of institutional investors as beneficial contributors 
in corporate governance affairs.  In contrast, director primacists affirm the 
settled U.S. corporate law principle that decision-making authority is 
properly vested in the board of directors.151  They justify this assertion 
based on the director primacy theory and team production theory.  This 
section discusses these opposing positions. 
1.  Shareholder Democracy 
and Institutional Investor Promise 
The most fundamental argument advocating for enhanced shareholder 
power is the contention that the current corporate structure hinders 
shareholders’ ability to become influential contributors in corporate 
affairs.152  Given the board’s broad managerial power, shareholders have 
only two options when they disagree with director decisions:  replace these 
directors or veto those decisions that require a shareholder vote.153  
Shareholders face obstacles when asserting both of these powers.154 
 
 146. See id. at 784. 
 147. See id. at 784–86. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. at 786. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006) (arguing that the present regime of 
limited shareholder voting is proper). 
 152. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833, 851–65 (2005). 
 153. See supra Part I.A. 
 154. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 
59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003) (arguing that although shareholder power to replace directors is vital 
to corporate governance, it is largely a myth). 
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The emergence of staggered boards has inhibited shareholders’ ability to 
replace directors who they believe are not adequately making decisions that 
maximize shareholder value.155  Under a “unitary board,” shareholders have 
an opportunity to replace an entire board of directors during one election.156  
When boards are staggered, shareholders must win two elections just to 
obtain majority control.157  Additionally, shareholders wishing to repeal 
these staggered boards have had little success due to the lack of response 
from management.158  Shareholders wishing to nominate alternative 
director candidates face substantial costs and difficulties because those who 
run a proxy contest bear the costs of a director campaign themselves.159 
Shareholder primacists also assert that the right to veto only major 
corporate decisions initiated by the board does not comport with the goal of 
maximizing company and shareholder value.160  The veto power ensures 
that major changes will never be made to the detriment of the company and 
its shareholders.161  Yet, because only the board can make corporate 
governance proposals, this power becomes essentially useless when the 
board prefers the status quo in spite of shareholders’ desire for change.162  
Shareholders are therefore stuck until the board proposes something.  Even 
where both shareholders and directors agree that major changes are 
necessary, the changes actually implemented will likely reflect board, rather 
than shareholder, preference.163  Consequently, unless shareholders are 
given power to initiate “rules-of-the-game decisions,” inefficient 
governance arrangements will likely result.164  In sum, shareholder 
primacists maintain that unless significant reforms to the corporate elections 
process are undertaken, shareholders will be unable to replace a board of 
directors whom they feel are constructing excessive compensation packages 
or will be prevented from altering the company’s rules in a beneficial way. 
Many corporate governance problems, including executive 
compensation, exist due to dispersed ownership.165  As a company’s 
ownership structure becomes composed of additional investors, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for any particular shareholder to influence the 
 
 155. See Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 853. 
 156. See Bebchuk, supra note 154, at 44. 
 157. See Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 853. 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 853–56 (providing statistics showing that management generally does 
not follow resolutions to repeal staggered boards). 
 159. See id. at 856. 
 160. See id. at 862–65; see also supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 161. See Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 862 (describing veto power as only a “negative” 
power). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 862–64. 
 164. See generally id. (proposing reforms allowing shareholders to intervene in corporate 
decisions and adopt “value-increasing governance arrangements that management 
disfavors”). 
 165. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street:  A Voucher 
Financing Proposals for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 271 (2003) 
(explaining how dispersed shareholders are in a poor position to remedy various corporate 
issues). 
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corporation in a profound way.166  This is due to both collective action and 
rational apathy problems.167  The tremendous rise of institutional investors 
within the last two decades has generated optimism for shareholder 
primacists because they believe these investors will be able to overcome 
these issues.168 
Collective action problems emerge as soon as multiple shareholders 
exist.169  Any single shareholder who expends money and resources to 
monitor or coordinate changes in management typically incurs all of the 
costs.170  Yet, all shareholders equally share any benefit that results from 
his or her actions.171  The costs accompanying shareholder activism 
therefore may not justify the potential benefits.172 
Shareholders also face rational apathy problems.173  Shareholders lack 
incentives to expend resources participating in corporate governance issues, 
such as voting, to the extent that they believe that their vote will not be 
pivotal in the outcome.174  When this sentiment exists, shareholders’ 
economic incentives are to remain passive.175  However, rational apathy 
decreases as shareholder ownership increases because it raises the 
likelihood that his or her vote will be decisive.176 
Many scholars assert that the rise of institutional investors as 
shareholders has the potential to overcome these issues because they have 
greater capacity and incentive to participate in corporate governance issues, 
such as executive compensation.177  Traditional institutional investors like 
pension funds and mutual funds typically own larger amounts of stock than 
individual investors.178  Depending on the circumstances, these stock 
blocks may be large enough to give the institutional investors an incentive 
 
 166. See Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010). 
 167. See id. at 792 (“The wide dispersal of shareholders led to collective action problems 
and apathy that made shareholder discipline of managers ineffective at best and almost 
impossible at worst.”). 
 168. See Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not:  An Analysis of Stock Option Plans, 
Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 170 (2000) 
(stating that institutional investors can and have shown the ability to be effective monitors). 
 169. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 454 (1991). 
 170. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 165, at 278. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 154. 
 173. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 165, at 278. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 155. 
 176. See id. at 154. 
 177. See, e.g., Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance:  How Incentive 
Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41, 48–53 
(2008) (providing statistics demonstrating that, despite their historic passivity, institutional 
investors continue to show promise as potential monitors). 
 178. See Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart:  Harnessing Altruistic Theory 
and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811, 
834–35 (2003). 
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to be active.179  Unlike individuals, they also have a greater ability to 
coordinate with one another and overcome collective action problems.180 
Other nontraditional institutions, such as hedge funds,181 have generated 
shareholder activist optimism due to their unique ability to generate 
significant benefits for shareholders.182  Most notably, hedge fund 
managers have a greater incentive to obtain positive returns for shareholders 
because managers’ pay is based on the performance of the company they 
invest in.183  Furthermore, the organizational structure of hedge funds 
allows them to positively impact overall shareholder wealth in a distinct 
way.184  Hedge funds are devoid of the regulatory and practical barriers that 
face mutual funds and the political pressures that confront pension funds.185  
For example, tax law does not inhibit a hedge fund from obtaining overly 
concentrated positions in a single company in the same manner as mutual 
funds.186  Overall, hedge funds have generated renewed hope among 
shareholder activists because they are more prepared to actively lobby for 
calculated changes that increase shareholder returns.187 
2.  Director Primacy and Shareholder Empowerment Skeptics 
In contrast to shareholder primacists, director primacists promote the 
need for untethered board of director power in corporate governance affairs.  
Part II.B.2.a discusses the director primacy model and Part II.B.2.b 
analyzes team production theory.  Then, Part II.B.2.c examines arguments 
made by those skeptical of the potential benefits of institutional investor 
prominence. 
 
 179. See id. at 835. 
 180. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 165, at 280. 
 181. Hedge funds are characterized as having four characteristics:  “(1) they are pooled, 
privately organized investment vehicles; (2) they are administered by professional 
investment managers with performance-based compensation and significant investments in 
the fund; (3) they are not widely available to the public; and (4) they operate outside of 
securities regulation and registration requirements.” Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 53 J. FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008). 
 182. See id. at 1730 (finding that “hedge funds increasingly engage in a new form of 
shareholder activism and monitoring that differs fundamentally from previous activist efforts 
by other institutional investors”); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds 
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007) 
(stating that “hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante”). 
 183. See Brav et al., supra note 181, at 1735. 
 184. See id. at 1730 (noting that hedge funds “can hold highly concentrated positions in 
small numbers of companies, and use leverage and derivatives to extend their reach”). 
 185. Kuang-Wei Chueh, Is Hedge Fund Activism New Hope for the Market?, 2008 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 724, 733–42. 
 186. See Brav et al., supra note 181, at 1734. 
 187. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58 (2011); see also Matteo Tonello, The 
Activism of Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. 
REG. (May 29, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/05/29/the-activism-of-carl-icahn-
and-bill-ackman/ (“A study by eVestment documents a seven-fold increase in the assets 
managed by [hedge funds] from $23 billion in 2002 to an estimated $166 billion in early 
2014.”) [https://perma.cc/FSQ7-L7WW]. 
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a.  Why Change History for Mystery? 
Lying at the core of shareholder disempowerment theories is the director 
primacy model, which advocates for a status quo concerning the allocation 
of power between shareholders and directors.188  The crux of this model 
rests on the belief that increased shareholder power “seems likely to disrupt 
the very mechanism that makes the widely held public corporation 
practicable:  namely, the centralization of . . . decisionmaking authority in 
the board of directors.”189  Given the various complexities and problems 
accompanying large corporations, this model advocates for maintaining a 
hierarchal structure with a centralized decision-making body.190  Moreover, 
it posits that conferring centralized decision-making authority upon the 
board is cheaper and more efficient.191  Increasing shareholder power 
would therefore only hinder the corporation because the board of directors 
requires considerable discretion.192  Unlike shareholder primacists who 
urge for expanded voting rights, advocates of this theory hold that 
shareholder voting should not be used as an assertion of power, but as a last 
resort accountability device.193  While critics of the status quo assert that 
allocating more voting power to shareholders serves as a better 
accountability check, this model emphasizes the preservation of the current 
structure by highlighting regulators’ lack of interference with it throughout 
history.194 
b.  Team Production Theory 
Similarly, team production theory stresses the value of a board member 
as a “mediating hierarch.”195  Distinct from various other models, this 
theory recognizes that other actors beyond just shareholders make firm-
specific investments196 in the corporation.197  Because determining the 
exact contribution of each individual actor is arduous, allocating profits 
accordingly is a challenging endeavor.  Prior agreements encourage 
shirking, and ex post rewards create incentives for rent seeking.198  The 
 
 188. See Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 1735–36. 
 189. Id. at 1749. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. at 1746. 
 192. See id. at 1749–50 (noting that increased shareholder power would inevitably shift 
some portion of the board’s authority to the shareholders). 
 193. See id. at 1750. 
 194. See id. at 1750–51. 
 195. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276–78 (1999). 
 196. Firm-specific investments are those that are difficult to recover once they are 
committed to the project. See id. at 249. 
 197. See id. at 250; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital 
Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
173, 188–97 (discussing various groups who make firm-specific investments). 
 198. See Blair & Stout, supra note 195, at 249.  Shirking occurs because the costs of 
doing so are born by all individuals, not just the shirker. See id. at 249 n.3.  Rent seeking is 
an inefficient situation where individuals are competing with each other to gain the greatest 
amount of wealth from a fixed sum. See id. at 249 nn.3–4. 
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need for an independent “mediating hierarch” becomes lucid when viewing 
the public corporation through this lens.  As a mediating hierarch, the board 
is in the best position to decisively balance the interests of competing 
stakeholders—executives, employees, creditors, and shareholders—to 
improve the joint welfare of the entire firm beyond that of just 
shareholders.199  In this capacity, the board functions in ways similar to 
trustees.200  Given the potential for competing interests, the current 
corporate structure allows boards to be isolated from various influences and 
control.201  The current shareholder voting power is therefore proper 
because it maintains the board’s power to balance competing interests 
without one group (shareholders) exerting excessive influence.202 
c.  The Fallacy of Institutional Investor Promise 
Despite the optimism expressed by shareholder primacists, many critics 
remain wary of the potential consequences that may accompany the 
emergence of institutional investors as shareholders.203  Two specific 
concerns support this skepticism:  the lack of incentive for institutional 
investors to become active participants in corporate affairs and the potential 
for inefficiencies due to their private interests. 
As noted above, shareholders remain passive in corporate governance 
issues due to collective action and rational apathy problems.204  While the 
evolution of institutional shareholders provides a theoretical solution to 
these problems, various findings support the belief that even the most active 
institutional investors spend minimal time on corporate governance 
issues.205  Although concentrated ownership alleviates some collective 
action concerns, institutional investors still face free-riding and economic-
cost problems that limit activist incentives.206  Furthermore, playing an 
 
 199. See id. at 271. But see Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public 
Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051 (arguing that modern boards lack knowledge of all the 
interests of a corporation’s constituents to balance them accordingly). 
 200. See Blair & Stout, supra note 195, at 253, 290–92 (noting that “boards exist not to 
protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the 
members of the corporate ‘team’”). 
 201. See id. at 291–92. 
 202. See id. at 309–15. 
 203. See generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006) (arguing that the divergent interests of institutional 
shareholders is a concern); P. Alexander Quimby, Addressing Corporate Short-Termism 
Through Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2013) (suggesting that the rise of 
institutional investors has accompanied the same practices that lead to financial crises). 
 204. See supra notes 169–76 and accompany text.  For further discussion of collective 
action and rational apathy problems, see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 154. 
 205. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 1751 (citing evidence showing that 
institutions rarely elected board of directors, coordinated activities, or submitted shareholder 
proposals). But see supra notes 181–87 and accompanying text (describing and highlighting 
studies demonstrating the unique motivation of hedge funds to actively participate in 
corporate governance affairs). 
 206. See John C. Bogle, The $7 Trillion Question:  Mutual Funds & Investment Welfare, 
1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 49–50 (2006); Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public 
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active role may generate undesirable tension with the company.207  Even 
though they may disagree with director or managerial decisions, large 
investors will either support them or remain passive in order to maintain 
valuable relationships.208  Doing so also allows them to uphold their 
reputation within the business community.209  Remaining passive may 
therefore represent a “win-win” situation from both an economic and 
reputational standpoint.210 
A second issue concerns institutional investor private interests and their 
ability to exercise opportunistic behavior to the detriment of other 
shareholders.211  When shareholders have similar agendas, it is more likely 
that they will be able to coordinate together in furtherance of a common 
goal.212  Nonetheless, modern shareholders come in many different 
varieties and with different self-interests.213  While shareholders are 
interested in enhancing overall shareholder value, they are also in a position 
to promote their private agendas whenever they expect to reap returns that 
outweigh the costs of doing so.214  For example, public and union pension 
funds may favor proposals that further their special labor interests at the 
expense of other shareholders.215 
Furthermore, “short-termism”216 practices of institutional investors may 
create further conflict between themselves and other shareholders and 
stockholders.217  Because many institutional investors such as hedge and 
mutual funds are concerned with short-term profitability, they are less likely 
to promote long-term policies that concern other shareholders.218  These 
short-term practices also collide with the objectives of corporate lawmakers 
who provided shareholders with voting rights to aid in promoting the 
 
Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2010) (acknowledging the reduction in 
collective action problems). 
 207. See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing:  The Case for Reuniting 
Ownership and Control, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 254, 277–78 (2004). 
 208. See id. at 278. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See Bogle, supra note 206, at 49–50 (“[P]assivity in governance may pay.  Let 
others undertake the hard work and costs of activism.  If their efforts are successful, the 
‘passive-ists’ . . . will not only reap the rewards . . . [but] will also increase their chances of 
getting the . . . business of the activists.”). 
 211. See Anabtawi, supra note 203, at 565–66. 
 212. See id. at 575. 
 213. See generally id. at 579–93 (discussing five different divergences among 
shareholders:  short-term and long-term shareholders, diversified and undiversified 
shareholders, inside and outside shareholders, public and union pension funds and economic 
shareholders, and hedge and unhedged shareholders). 
 214. See id. at 593. 
 215. See id. at 588–90. 
 216. Quimby, supra note 203, at 391.  Short-termism is “the practice of short-term 
investing by shareholders and short-term business decisions by directors and managers at the 
expense of long-term corporate sustainability.” Id. 
 217. See id. at 391–96. 
 218. See Anabtawi, supra note 203, at 564 (“[T]he hedge fund is [therefore] likely to 
favor policies . . . that produce short-term gains, even if a more patient investment 
orientation would generate higher returns over the long term.”). 
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company’s long-term future.219  Regardless, shareholder primacists argue 
that even if institutional shareholders pursue their short-term interests, they 
will be unable to garner the majority support that is needed.220  Yet, their 
large size may still allow them to form coalitions or negotiate with 
management from an influential power position.221 
C.  Is Disclosure the Cure? 
Disclosure requirements have been an integral component of executive 
compensation reforms dating back to the 1930s.222  The recently adopted 
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule conforms to the SEC’s long-held belief that 
“[a]n educated investing public ultimately provides the best defense against 
fraud and costly mistakes.”223  Although most knowledge of executive 
compensation derives from mandatory disclosure requirements, some argue 
that disclosure embodies a “double-edged sword” because the transparency 
it provides may actually contribute to rising executive pay.224  This section 
analyzes both edges of this sword against the backdrop of eighty years of 
rising executive compensation levels. 
1.  Benefits of Disclosure on Executive Compensation 
Disclosure reforms began as an attempt to address the scarcity of 
executive compensation information available to the public and investors in 
the marketplace.225  Generally, regulators believe that markets operate more 
efficiently when all parties are privy to the same information.226  In addition 
to greater transparency and efficiency, other benefits of disclosure have 
been acknowledged.227  First, it assists shareholders in reducing the costs to 
become informed, thereby making it easier for them to actively participate 
in corporate governance affairs.228  This counteracts rational apathy 
problems that would exist if shareholders needed to expend resources to 
 
 219. See Quimby, supra note 203, at 397. 
 220. See Anabtawi, supra note 203, at 594. 
 221. See id. at 596–97. 
 222. See generally Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”:  The 
Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 707 (2010) 
(stating that information regarding executive compensation pay practices was rarely 
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 223. See SEC, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5 (2005), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX5D-DNYV]. 
 224. Walker, supra note 64, at 658. 
 225. See Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation Regulation:  Corporate America, Heal 
Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 496 (2005) (noting that before the 1930s, compensation of 
executives was not public material). 
 226. See id. 
 227. See generally Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive 
Compensation, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489 (1998) (discussing the role of disclosure in affecting 
how executives are paid and how much they are paid in light of the rise of institutional 
investors). 
 228. See id. at 497–98. But see Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive 
Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 399, 447 (1998) (arguing that more 
disclosure increases monitoring costs because it overwhelms institutions with additional 
materials beyond those needed to analyze compensation schemes). 
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obtain material information.229  Second, mandatory disclosure encourages 
compensation committees to devise compensation schemes that better align 
with shareholder goals.230  When first adopting disclosure regulations, the 
SEC believed that disclosure requirements would shame boards of directors 
into doing the right thing for shareholders and employees.231  Today, by 
requiring companies to not only disclose compensation levels but also to 
explain why these levels are chosen, companies may revisit their 
compensation practices not just to comply with regulations but to avoid 
public pressure or embarrassment.232  Given their large size, disclosure 
additionally allows institutional investors to deter management and generate 
a reputation for scrutinizing excessive pay packages.233  Other benefits to 
disclosure include allowing investors to make better investment decisions, 
improving stock market accuracy, deterring fraud, and enhancing 
accountability for boards and compensation committees.234  Regulators 
recognized these benefits and thus, by the 1990s, aimed at making 
disclosure clearer and easier for shareholders to understand and use.235 
2.  Disclosure Detriments and Ratcheting-up Problems 
On the other edge of the sword is the belief that disclosure may in fact 
result in higher levels of pay for executives.236  Various studies suggest that 
the growth of executive compensation has increased beyond that which can 
be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry 
classification.237  From these studies emerged the proposition that enhanced 
disclosure leads to compensation “ratcheting upwards,” as corporate boards 
use disclosed compensation practices of other firms as a benchmark in 
setting their own pay practices.238  Compensation committees use “peer 
groups” when formulating compensation packages.239  Typically, these 
committees believe that their CEO is at least above average, and want to 
 
 229. See Iacobucci, supra note 227, at 498. 
 230. See id. at 497–98. 
 231. See Markham, supra note 68, at 278.  This goal remained the same when the SEC 
amended its reforms in the 1990s. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 336. 
 232. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 344. 
 233. See Iacobucci, supra note 227, at 498–99 (discussing the potential for institutional 
investors to be the solution to various corporate governance issues). 
 234. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other 
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479–80 (2007). 
 235. See supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text. 
 236. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 1264 (suggesting that disclosure may increase 
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 237. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 68, at 287 (citing a study stating that mean 
compensation in 2003 would have been roughly half of its actual size if compensation was 
actually based on the firm size, performance, and industry classification). 
 238. See Walker, supra note 64, at 658; see also Simmons, supra note 2, at 343 
(highlighting Walker’s argument that enhanced disclosure may lead to more opaque, 
inefficient compensation practices). 
 239. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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pay their CEO at levels reflecting this conviction.240  When all boards strive 
to compensate their CEOs at levels higher than their competitors, it leads to 
an increase in pay across all markets.241  This creates inefficiencies for 
regulators because it undermines the link between pay and performance by 
allowing top executives to be paid at similarly high levels regardless of 
corporate performance.242 
D.  Are We Using the Right Metric? 
Assuming that disclosure can be beneficial, it is still apparent that 
benefits will not be realized without disclosure of the “right” information.  
The usefulness of a “pay ratio” to shareholders is therefore pivotal to the 
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule’s success.  Current SEC Chair Mary Jo 
White stated, “To say that the views on the pay-ratio disclosure requirement 
are divided is an obvious understatement.”243  Despite recognizing its high 
compliance costs, the SEC has maintained that the pay ratio is a fitting 
metric that will provide useful information to shareholders.244  Others 
remain skeptical of both its reliability and impending practicality for 
shareholders and potential investors.245  This section discusses arguments 
proffered by both pay-ratio advocates and critics. 
1.  Pay-Ratio Advocates 
Proponents of the pay ratio emphasize its ability to help investors 
evaluate CEO pay levels when exercising voting rights on executive 
compensation matters such as say-on-pay.246  Moreover, many suggest that 
 
 240. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 336 (“Typically, compensation committees would 
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reflecting the fact that their CEO is (of course) above average.”). 
 241. See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring:  The 
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 916–17 (1992). 
 242. See Marino, supra note 52, at 1213; see also Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating:  
The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1877 (1992) (noting 
that regardless of performance, the “ratcheting effect” generates continuously higher levels 
of pay). 
 243. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting on Security-Based Swap 
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 244. See Pay Ratio Press Release, supra note 13.  The SEC estimates first year 
implementation costs to be $1.3 billion. See Timothy J. Bartl, Deep-Six the CEO Pay Ratio 
Rule, CFO (Oct. 1, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/10/deep-six-ceo-pay-
ratio-rule/ [https://perma.cc/3JKG-ZDPS]. 
 245. See generally Bartl, supra note 244 (opining that the pay-ratio produces a 
misleading, immaterial disclosure that generates a tremendous financial burden on 
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 246. See, e.g., Brandon J. Rees, AFL-CIO, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Require 
Pay Ratio Disclosure (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-
562.pdf (“Pay ratio disclosure will also help investors evaluate CEO pay levels when voting 
on executive compensation matters such as ‘say-on-pay’ resolutions.”) 
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Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Require Pay Ratio Disclosure (Nov. 26, 2013), 
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the company-specific metric will allow greater insight into the health of 
corporations, including the integrity of corporate leaders and the 
disclosure’s effect on employee morale.247  As some have noted, high levels 
of CEO pay relative to other workers can have a detrimental effect on 
employee morale and productivity.248  Observing low morale may therefore 
lead companies to alter their compensation structures in a positive way.249  
Because the pay ratio is intended to be company specific, its advocates also 
suggest that it will alleviate the “ratcheting up” of executive compensation 
that resulted from other disclosure regulations.250  Rather than focusing on 
horizontal comparisons among CEOs, the new metric allows shareholders 
and investors to consider the vertical distribution of pay within their 
particular firm.251 
2.  Pay-Ratio Critics 
Critics assert that the pay ratio will not change investor practices 
significantly, because most shareholders already have established methods 
for determining what pay level they consider appropriate for CEOs.252  
Since 2010, the fifteen shareholder resolutions advocating for a pay-ratio 
method of disclosure received the support of less than 7 percent of 
shareholders.253  Importantly, the SEC also may be inadvertently skewing 
the calculation by using the ratio.254  For example, if Company A has five 
employees earning $50,000 per year, they generate the same median salary 
($50,000) as Company B, which includes two employees earning $10,000 
and three employees earning $50,000.  Assuming the compensation of the 
CEO is the same in both companies, Company A and Company B will have 
 
CEO-to-worker pay ratios as an additional metric in evaluating say-on-pay votes and other 
executive compensation issues.”) [https://perma.cc/34ZK-W6GD]. 
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 248. See, e.g., Heather Slavkin Corzo, Pay Ratio Rule Gives Shareholders Better Exec 
Comp Info, CFO (Oct. 1, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/10/pay-ratio-rule-
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 251. See id. 
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the same pay ratio, even though Company B has a less equal pay 
structure.255  Accordingly, the use of a weighted average256 in computing 
the pay of average employees may prove beneficial because it accounts for 
how many workers get paid at different levels within the company and 
limits the impact of outliers.257 
Critics further maintain that the ratio is a “silly” or “misleading” 
calculation because it does not provide investors with useful comparable 
data.258  For example, a domestic corporation may have a better ratio than a 
multinational company due to legal, currency, or cost-of-living 
differences.259  The inclusion of part-time and seasonal workers also raises 
concerns about ratio accuracy because some industries require more part-
time, hourly paid workers than other industries.260  A company in the retail 
outlet industry may have a higher ratio than a bank, which requires less 
part-time, hourly paid workers.261  The ratio thus might not reflect these 
differences and could potentially mislead shareholders and investors about a 
company’s health.262 
Lastly, critics discredit the notion that the ratcheting-up problem will be 
alleviated through the pay ratio.263  Although more weight is given to the 
vertical distribution of pay, nothing inhibits boards and compensation 
committees from using the pay ratios of competitors as a benchmark when 
crafting compensation packages.264  Companies may potentially increase 
CEO pay to elevate their pay ratios to levels similar to their competitors.  
This would create a broad increase in compensation across all industries in 
a manner similar to that observed following previous disclosure 
regulations.265 
 
 255. For a similar hypothetical, see id. 
 256. A weighted average is that “in which each quantity to be averaged is assigned a 
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weightedaverage.asp?optm=sa_v2 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8ABL-
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 257. See Seelig, supra note 252. 
 258. See David McCann, CEO Pay Ratio Rule Rankles Both Sides of Heated Debate, 
CFO (Aug. 5, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/08/ceo-pay-ratio-rule-rankles-
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 260. See McCann, supra note 258. 
 261. See IKE BRANNON, CTR. CAP. MKTS., THE EGREGIOUS COSTS OF THE SEC’S PAY-
RATIO DISCLOSURE REGULATION (2014), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Egregious-Cost-of-Pay-Ratio-5.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQE2-
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III.  CEO PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE MODIFICATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTOR COMPROMISE 
Regardless of the various schisms and uncertainties that exist within the 
executive compensation debate, one thing is universally recognized:  
executive compensation has contributed to the income inequality gap in this 
country and attempts to curb it have been futile to date.  The efficacy of any 
mandatory disclosure regulation depends on two vital factors:  (1) whether 
companies are disclosing the right information to shareholders and, if they 
are, (2) whether proper mechanisms exist to allow them to effectuate 
meaningful change.  The future implications for the CEO Pay Ratio 
Disclosure Rule are no exception.  Part III.A proposes altering the median 
employee calculation to a weighted average approach and calls for two 
additional calculations to be disclosed in conjunction with the modified pay 
ratio:  the percent change of the modified pay ratio from the previous year 
and the percent change in company profits from the previous year.  Part 
III.B proposes the adoption of quasi-mandatory say-on-pay votes that are 
triggered when company pay practices are detrimentally uncorrelated with 
performance. 
A.  New and Improved Pay Ratio 
Given the limited success of past disclosure reforms, the use of a pay 
ratio represents an innovative attempt by the SEC to depict a company’s 
pay practices and health through a single metric.  Nevertheless, various 
alterations to the ratio may enhance its efficiency and usefulness for 
shareholders and investors.  First, the use of a weighted average should be 
used when calculating the average compensation of other workers besides 
the CEO.266  Furthermore, two numerical calculations should be disclosed 
in conjunction with this modified pay ratio:  (1) the percent change of the 
pay ratio from the previous year and (2) the percent change of company 
profits from the previous year. 
1.  Pay-Ratio Shortcoming 
and Weighted Average Implementation 
Employing a weighted average approach, rather than a median 
calculation, better describes a company’s pay structure and inhibits ratio 
manipulation.  The weighted average provides enhanced accuracy because 
it gives greater weight to common compensation levels.267  For example, if 
Company A employs 101 workers, fifty of whom earn $100,000, and fifty 
one of whom earn $50,000, the median calculation would equal $50,000.  
This value does not demonstrate that Company A pays roughly half of its 
employees at a level greater than the median.  Under a weighted average 
approach, this calculation would equal approximately $74,750, which better 
exemplifies Company A’s pay structure. 
 
 266. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, a weighted average approach better safeguards against ratio 
manipulation that would be inconsistent with the goals of the regulation.  
Under the median calculation, a company has a greater capability of 
improving its pay ratio without altering CEO pay at all.  In the example 
above, if Company A hired only two additional workers at a salary of 
$100,000, the median calculation would double to $100,000.  Although this 
would lower its pay ratio, it would not provide the intended results of the 
current regulation and would mislead shareholders.  Applying this 
manipulative tactic under a weighted average approach would not alter the 
ratio in a profound way, as the new weighted average would rise slightly, to 
approximately $75,240.  Because companies will be unable to hire new 
workers or modify the compensation of a few current workers to profoundly 
alter their pay ratios, reducing CEO compensation becomes the most 
practical tactic. 
Lastly, the use of a weighted average assuages concerns accompanying 
the Rule’s inclusion of part-time and seasonal workers in the employee 
population.268  These workers typically earn lower wages than full-time 
employees.  Under the current Rule, their inclusion may lower the median 
compensation for all other employees besides the CEO in a way that does 
not accurately reflect a company’s pay structure.  Conversely, their 
inclusion under a weighted average calculation is marginalized because 
there are usually substantially fewer part-time workers as compared to full-
time employees.  This provides a greater incentive for companies to hire 
more of these workers without fear that doing so might negatively affect 
their pay ratios. 
2.  Percent-Change Disclosure Benefits 
Requiring companies to disclose the percent changes proposed may 
present shareholders with a better picture of a company’s health and 
facilitate shareholder activism in the process.  Shareholders and investors 
are given greater insight into how a company’s compensation structure is 
changing in relation to performance.  This allows them to better determine 
whether pay levels crafted by the board are justified.  For example, 
shareholders observing a growing pay ratio in conjunction with decreasing 
company profits may be more skeptical of board decisions.  Greater 
emphasis is therefore placed on the board’s CD&A to justify why pay 
levels should be at certain levels.  Without understanding compensation 
levels in relation to performance, shareholders may be inclined to simply 
defer to the explanations provided by the board. 
Including percent changes may additionally generate increased 
shareholder activism because it gives shareholders and investors insight into 
the future stability and growth of a company.  Most shareholders are 
concerned with long-term policies and company value.269  Long-term 
shareholders who observe a period of declining profits in conjunction with 
 
 268. See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. 
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higher pay ratios may be more inclined to actively lobby for executive pay 
alterations that provide long-term benefits to the company. 
B.  Quasi-Mandatory Voting 
and Shareholder-Director Balance 
Part III.B.1 proposes the adoption of quasi-mandatory say-on-pay votes.  
Then, Part III.B.2 discusses the proposal’s ability to aid shareholders in 
influencing executive compensation without disrupting the necessary 
powers of the board of directors. 
1.  Annual Quasi-Mandatory Say-on-Pay 
Regulators have continuously and unsuccessfully attempted to link pay to 
performance by using incentives, specifically in the form of stock grants 
and options.270  To date, these incentives had been targeted solely at 
management and executives in an effort to get them to make decisions that 
maximize shareholder wealth.271  Nevertheless, it is now time to return the 
favor to shareholders by incentivizing them to become influential actors in 
fighting high executive compensation levels.  To promote greater activism, 
say-on-pay votes should occur annually, rather than the current scheme that 
allows shareholders to decide whether they should occur annually, every 
two years, or every three years.  This eliminates the possibility that 
companies will compensate their CEOs and top executives higher in years 
with no shareholder vote. 
The ideal scenario for shareholders and the public involves two different 
trends:  (1) the change in profits is increasing at a higher rate than the 
change in the proposed pay ratio or (2) the change in profits is decreasing at 
a lower rate than the change in the proposed pay ratio.  Shareholder votes 
should continue to remain advisory when these situations occur.  However, 
shareholder votes should carry more weight when two alternative, 
unfavorable conditions exist:  (1) the change in profits is increasing at a 
lower rate than the change in the proposed pay ratio or (2) the change in 
profits is decreasing faster than the change in the proposed pay ratio.  When 
either of these criteria are met, if 50 percent of shareholders vote with 
disapproval for the compensation of their CEO, the CEO is subject to a 
clawback provision that requires him or her to return the amount of pay 
necessary to equate the change in the ratio with the change in profits.  For 
example, if Company A’s pay ratio increases by 10 percent but company 
profits only increase by 5 percent, if the majority of shareholders vote with 
disapproval as to the CEO’s salary, he or she would be required to return 
pay until the percent change in the ratio reached 5 percent as well. 
 
 270. For a discussion on the emergence and results of incentive-based compensation, see 
supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra Part II.A. 
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2.  Shareholder-Director Balance 
This proposal creates a compensation-setting process that properly 
balances the dual interests of both shareholder and director primacists.  Part 
III.B.2.a discusses the proposal’s adherence to director primacy views while 
Part III.B.2.b analyzes its ability to effectively aid shareholders and assuage 
various concerns past regulations failed to rectify. 
a.  Director Power Preservation 
Corporations involve many contributing constituents including 
shareholders, creditors, directors, and executives, each of whom strives to 
maximize their individual utility.272  The modern corporation necessitates 
an isolated decision-making body capable of balancing these interests.273  
The board is in the best position to do so because it is composed of 
independent directors who can objectively make decisions for the 
betterment of the corporation as a whole.  Conforming to these views, this 
proposal affirms the necessary powers of the board to manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation in accordance with section 141 of the 
Delaware Code.  Directors and committees retain the ability to craft 
compensation packages as they see fit.  Shareholders remain uninvolved in 
the compensation-setting process and lack any power to usurp board 
decisions in favor of their own.  Their ability to influence CEO 
compensation is only triggered under unique circumstances and when 
enough shareholders disapprove of the CEO’s compensation.  Even when 
these requirements are satisfied, shareholders will still be unable to exert 
any decision-making power because the amount of compensation a CEO 
would forfeit in a clawback is automatically determined.  CEOs would be 
required to return the amount needed to equate the two percent changes 
regardless of what shareholders believe should be the appropriate 
compensation level.  These alterations therefore do not compromise the 
board’s ability to carry out its decision-making functions nor do they 
provide shareholders with any power to substitute the board’s decisions for 
their own. 
Additionally, board of director independence from managerial influence 
may be strengthened.  The existence of the shareholder vote creates an 
additional disincentive for boards to succumb to the desires of powerful 
managers.274  Awarding a CEO with the compensation he or she desires 
may alter the ratio in a way that triggers the mandatory shareholder vote.  
This may generate both public and shareholder criticism and increase 
potential outrage costs.  If shareholders obtain the majority votes needed for 
the clawback to apply, these directors will be scrutinized even further.  
 
 272. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 273. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 
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Therefore, the directors may not be willing to confront the heightened 
potential risks associated with yielding to management’s desires. 
b.  Shareholders’ Enhanced Rights and Solutions 
Without altering the board’s decision-making functions, this proposal 
affords shareholders a mechanism to effectuate meaningful change on 
executive compensation issues in a way hindered by the current structure.  
Excessive executive pay has deleterious effects on individuals, companies, 
and the national economy.275  These harmful consequences necessitate a 
way for shareholders to hold boards accountable for suboptimal 
compensation decisions.  Yet unlike other major corporate decisions that 
are halted by a majority shareholder veto, no such mechanism currently 
exists in the compensation-setting process.276  Although say-on-pay votes 
offer shareholders greater rights than previously held, their advisory status 
still marginalizes their impact and creates little incentive for shareholders to 
be active.  Providing shareholders with quasi-mandatory say-on-pay votes 
allows them greater influence in situations where CEO pay may be 
unjustifiably high to the detriment of various corporate constituents.  
Although they still lack decision-making power, expanded voting power 
provides them with an accountability device similar to a shareholder veto of 
other major corporate decisions.  Their ability to influence CEO pay 
furthermore incentivizes them to take an active role in the manner intended 
by the SEC. 
Providing shareholders with more “skin in the game” additionally 
enhances shareholder activism by alleviating both collective action and 
rational apathy problems.  Because shareholder votes may be pivotal in 
influencing CEO pay, shareholders will have more of an incentive to 
coordinate and oppose compensation packages that they disapprove.  
Moreover, it assuages the ratcheting up of compensation that accompanied 
previous disclosure regulations.  Boards will be inhibited from using 
compensation packages of peer groups as a benchmark because similar 
companies have different structures and profits from year to year.  If boards 
decide to raise the compensation of their CEOs to that of their competitors, 
not only will they confront higher public and shareholder scrutiny than ever 
before, but doing so may increase the pay ratio to a level that triggers the 
shareholder accountability mechanism. 
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